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Abstract
This paper argues that in order to make
progress today in automating argumentation mining from legal documents, we
have a critical need for two things. First,
we need a sufficient supply of manually
annotated corpora, as well as theoretical
and experimental evidence that those annotated data are accurate. Second, we
need protocols for effectively training
people to perform the tasks and sub-tasks
required to create those annotations. Such
protocols are necessary not only for a
team approach to annotation and for
quality assurance of the finished annotations, but also for developing and testing
software to assist humans in the process
of annotation. Drawing upon the latest
work at Hofstra University’s Law, Logic
and Technology Research Laboratory in
New York, the paper offers an extended
example from the problem of annotating
attribution relations, as an illustration of
why obtaining consistent and accurate
annotations in law is extremely difficult,
and of why protocols are necessary. Attribution is the problem of determining
which actor believes, asserts, or relies
upon the truth of a proposition as a premise or a conclusion of an argument. The
paper illustrates that in applying argumentation mining to legal documents,
annotating attribution relations correctly
is a critical task.

Relevant Seminar Topics
- Automated identification of arguments
- Automated identification of relationships
between arguments
- Argument annotation methods and tools

- Annotation of argumentation corpora
- Applications of argument mining to legal
documents
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Introduction: Some Peculiar Features
of Artificial Intelligence and Law

This paper addresses the goal of developing
software to detect and extract patterns of argument and reasoning (argumentation mining) from
legal texts, for the purpose of assisting lawyers
and litigants in constructing potential arguments
for new situations or cases.
There is available today an exploding array of
available analytics and other software tools, such
as IBM’s Bluemix and Google’s open-source
TensorFlow. There is also widespread and growing expertise available in natural language processing and language technologies. But application of these tools and this expertise to legal documents has fallen far, far behind similar applications in health care and bioinformatics, for example. What is the explanation for this phenomenon? After all, electronic databases of legal
documents date back to the early 1980s (e.g.,
commercial databases such as Westlaw and LexisNexis), and legal documents are becoming
freely accessible through the websites of governmental institutions.
Part of the explanation is that researchers in
the legal academy have generally ignored the
development of practical, operational theories of
legal reasoning, which could be used to inform
software developers about what they should be
looking for in legal documents. Without knowing
in sufficient, concrete detail what lawyers and
judges “see” when they read and understand legal texts, there is no sound theory for what developers of semantic analytics should be searching for in texts, and no sound metrics for how
close they come to finding what they should be
finding. Without an adequate, operational theory
of how lawyers understand the meaning of a le-

gal text, software developers have no sound
model to simulate or emulate.
A second part of the explanation for the lack
of application to legal texts is that the task appears particularly difficult and daunting using
today’s software tools. Law faculties educate law
students in how to “reason like a lawyer,” but it
takes many years of study to develop even a
basic proficiency in the needed skills. Moreover,
even experienced lawyers often differ on how to
analyze important legal texts – indeed, analyzing
legal texts insightfully and creating convincing
legal arguments about their interpretation is the
core task of the legal profession. When one mentions research into “artificial intelligence and
law” to a practicing lawyer, the immediate response is nearly always some form of: “You are
trying to develop machines that can replace lawyers?” While there are many good responses to
that voiced worry, the correct underlying instinct
of most lawyers is that “legal reasoning” (whatever that is) is at the heart of what lawyers do,
and there is substantial doubt about whether any
software today can even begin to perform that
task. Understanding the possible alternative
meanings of the text of a legal document, appreciating their legal significance, and using that
information to craft potential arguments for new
cases, seem like particularly difficult tasks for
artificial intelligence as we know it today.
Even with the advanced machine learning approaches that we have today, this core task of
argumentation mining seems well beyond our
capabilities. It is one thing (although certainly a
significant thing!) to mine Wikipedia pages for
text passages and information needed for performing question-answer tasks. And it is one
thing (and an impressive thing!) for technologyassisted review (TAR) systems to search “big
data” sets of millions of emails for documents of
relevance to a query, and to identify for redaction
those portions of text in relevant documents that
might enjoy a legal privilege, in order to make
lawyers marginally more efficient in document
review. But it is quite another thing to mine judicial decisions for threads of argument and reasoning, and to extract information to answer queries about legal rules or legal policies or findings
of fact, in order to formulate possible arguments
for future cases. While some tasks that software
is able to do at some level of proficiency can be
useful in legal practice (for example, questionanswer, e-discovery), the core of what a lawyer
does (argument mining from legal documents)
remains a goal over the research horizon.

A third part of the explanation is that reasoning and inference in law does indeed have some
peculiar features. Legal reasoning is pragmatic in
the sense of being oriented toward regulating
action, of occurring in real time as a result of
limited resources and based on incomplete information, and of balancing accuracy against
competing non-epistemic objectives (Walker et
al. 2015b). And especially in judicial proceedings, inferences are often made through a structured process in which multiple actors play various roles, and particular actors make decisions
concerning various logical components of the
overall inference (Walker et al. 2013). The software that will prove adequate to assist in legal
argumentation and reasoning will have to respect
the pragmatic aspects of such participatory processes. And it will have to be adept at extracting
information about such argumentation processes
from legal documents such as judicial decisions.
This paper does not discuss software solutions
to these challenges. Instead, it discusses two major barriers today that are critically impeding the
successful application of argumentation mining
to legal documents. The first barrier is the lack of
annotated corpora that can be used for software
development and testing. The second barrier is
the lack of protocols for training human annotators and for achieving quality assurance over
their annotations. After discussing these two barriers in general, the paper illustrates the nature of
these problems by discussing the annotation of
attribution relations in judicial decisions as an
extended example.

2

The Problem: The Need for Annotated Legal Corpora and (Human) Protocols

This section of the paper outlines in a qualitative
way two major barriers to developing automated
argumentation mining for legal documents.
2.1

The Need for Annotated Corpora from
Legal Documents

When a lawyer reads a judicial decision, hunting
for the elements of a potential legal argument,
what is it that she “looks for” and “sees”? A
practicing attorney is likely to respond that she
looks for and sees such things as legal rules, presumptions of law, arguments based on legal principles or legal policies, information about the
legal procedures involved in the case, allegations
of the parties, testimony of the witnesses, opinions of the experts, reasoning of the experts, ba-

ses for the expert opinions, critiques of the credibility of witnesses, findings of fact, rulings on
the law, and so forth. Such a list forms the
“stuff” of legal education, and discourse between
lawyers occurs on this conceptual level. As with
any native or trained reader for content in a specialized field, a lawyer comprehends the meaning of a legal document largely without attending
to the linguistic cues that are the means of identifying that meaning.
But software engineers who hope to design artificial systems that can assist with, participate
in, simulate, or act in reliance on such a process
of text comprehension need lawyers not only to
identify what the lawyer is looking for in an abstract sense (e.g., a “legal rule”), but also to provide a sufficient number of annotated examples
that can be used for training and testing.
Moreover, the annotated data must be reasonably valid or accurate, with respect to adequately
capturing the true or intended meaning of the
text. And if multiple annotators share the annotation task, then there must be reasonable interannotator agreement on how to annotate the text,
before there is any hope for achieving a consistent and accurate set of annotated corpora.
Finally, the types of semantic information that
a lawyer may find useful in argumentation mining might differ from those that are useful in filing a tax form, or in monitoring for regulatory
compliance. What types are useful depends in
part upon the ultimate objective, and success in
mining information is necessarily a function of
that objective. And one set of semantic types
might not be suitable, or at least sufficient, for all
purposes.
2.2

The Need for (Human) Protocols

I am using the phrase “human protocol” as shorthand for a method or process by which a human
lawyer can perform a sub-task that is part of the
activity of reading a legal document with comprehension. If the reading is done for the purpose
of argumentation mining, for example, this
means developing protocols by which lawyers
could perform the sub-tasks that together constitute understanding the argument-relevant information in the text. We must fill the gap described
in Section 2.1 – the gap between lawyers’ comprehending the meaning of a legal text and their
having an operational method for arriving at that
comprehension.
First, developing such protocols requires decomposing the task of “intelligent reading” into
sub-tasks. Until we break “reading intelligently”

into many sub-parts, we cannot hope to develop
software that will emulate or even assist human
performance.
Second, for each sub-task, this approach requires developing protocols whose input consists
of: (A) observable information from the document, usually linguistic in nature, and (B) background knowledge that the reader brings to the
comprehension of the document. The output of
executing the protocol would be text annotated
for argument-related elements. Those annotations would need to include the semantic and
pragmatic typing of various important elements.
Third, there should be methods for integrating
the output from the various sub-tasks into the
desired overall outcome. This is where the purpose behind the reading becomes particularly
important. If the purpose is to extract information
from statutes, regulations, and past judicial decisions and use that information to help formulate
effective arguments in new legal cases, then such
new arguments become the ultimate output of the
human annotation.
Without protocols for how humans can perform the sub-tasks and integration with reasonable proficiency and accuracy, there is very little
hope of developing the valid (or even reliable)
annotated corpora discussed in Section 2.1. And
without such protocols for humans, there is little
hope of developing a sufficient supply of annotated corpora for machine learning.
Moreover, without such protocols for how
humans correctly perform the sub-tasks and integration, software engineers will have very few
intuitions about how to design software to accomplish a similar task on smaller datasets. This
is not to suggest that software methods must
track or simulate human methods. But human
methods often lead to insights about how to
structure the software code. Indeed, if, as I suspect, argumentation mining in many areas of law
turn out to be “little data” problems instead of
“big data” problems, then insights into methods
of problem solving will be even more valuable.

3

An Extended Example: Annotating
Attribution Relations

As an illustration of the two challenges or barriers discussed in Section 2 above (creating annotated legal corpora and human protocols), this
section discusses a particularly difficult sub-task
for human or machine reading of a judicial decision for purposes of argumentation mining. This
sub-task is the identification and semantic anno-

tation of “attribution relations” within the text.
The problem of attribution has a role in argumentation mining in many contexts other than law.
But solving the attribution problem in a legal
context poses perhaps the most significant challenges when it comes to producing annotated
corpora and human protocols.
This discussion is adapted from (Walker et al.
2015a). It is based on our work at the Hofstra
University Research Laboratory for Law, Logic
and Technology (LLT Lab), which I direct. We
currently have projects for annotating argumentation in three types of judicial decisions in the
United States: vaccine-injury compensation decisions, medical malpractice decisions, and decisions about veterans claims.
3.1

The Attribution Problem

In the context of argumentation mining, the attribution problem is the descriptive sub-task of
determining “who believes what” – that is, determining which actor or participant subscribes
to the truth of, concurs with, or relies upon a
stated proposition. When I refer to “belief” in
this context, I do not mean simply the mental
states of human actors, but also a more general
relation within argumentation. The proponent of
an argument believes, asserts, or relies upon the
truth of a proposition as a premise or a conclusion of that argument. Attribution helps to answer the question: “Whose argument is it?”
Accurate attribution of propositions is often a
critical task for argumentation mining. Unless a
document relates only propositions that are believed, asserted or relied upon by a single actor
and no one else, it becomes critical to determine
who is asserting what. For example, a judge
might write in her decision the sentence the varicella vaccine can cause neuropathy in humans,
but writing this sentence does not always indicate that the judge herself believes the stated
proposition to be true. The sentence might report
the unproved allegation of a party in a legal
pleading, or the testimony of an expert witness,
or the text of a document exhibit, or a conclusion
or finding of fact by the judge herself. Argumentation mining from judicial decisions requires
accurate attribution of stated propositions to the
parties, witnesses, and documents placed in evidence, as well as to the judge or factfinder.
Attribution within the context of argumentation mining from legal documents is merely a
special case of a broader problem of mining attribution relations. Attribution, as a general type
of relation, is a classic problem area in natural

language processing (Bunt et al., 2012; Krestel et
al., 2008; Pareti 2011; Pareti et al., 2013). As a
clear example of the problem, if a sentence explicitly attributes a proposition to some source by
using a direct quotation, then this is some evidence for attributing the content of the quotation
to that source (Krestel et al., 2008). However,
quotation generally does not imply that the author of the sentence attributing the quotation believes the content of the quotation (the proposition being attributed) to be true. Support (if any)
for attribution of the quoted proposition to the
sentence author often must derive from the context in which the sentence was written, rather
than from the semantics of the sentence itself. If
this is true for direct quotations, then attribution
in non-quotation situations is generally even
more complicated (Pareti et al., 2013).
When it comes to the attribution problem in
respect to argumentation mining from legal documents, there has been very limited work.
Grover et al. (2003) reported on a project to annotate sentences in House of Lords judgments
for their argumentative roles. Two tasks were: (i)
attributing statements to the Law Lord speaking
about the case or to someone else (attribution);
and (ii) classifying sentences as formulating the
law objectively vs. assessing the law as favoring
a conclusion or not favoring it (comparison).
This work extended the work of Teufel and
Moens (2002) on attribution in scientific articles.
The House of Lords judgments studied by
Grover et al. (2003) treated facts as already settled in the lower courts, and engaged in policybased reasoning about issues of law. I have
found no empirical work that focuses on the
problem of attribution in the factfinding portions
of judicial decisions. However, such decisions
might utilize scientific evidence, and therefore
work on attribution in factfinding decisions complements the work of both Grover et al. (2003)
and Teufel and Moens (2002).
3.2

The Elements of Attribution Relations

We can represent attribution relations using at
least three main elements or predicate arguments,
which is consistent with Pareti (2011):
(A) The attribution object: the proposition
that we attribute to some actor, and which we
infer the actor believes, asserts, or relies upon;
(B) The attribution subject: the actor to
whom we attribute belief in the attribution object; and

(C) The attribution cue: the lexical anchor or
cue that signals the attribution, and which
provides the evidentiary basis for making the
attribution.
In short, an attribution object is a proposition, an
attribution subject is an actor, and an attribution
cue is some word, phrase, or other linguistic cue.
The attribution cue functions as the linguistic
evidence supporting an attribution relation
(Webber and Joshi, 2012).
3.3

Producing Accurate Manual Annotations

In reading a judicial decision to understand who
is espousing what line of argumentation or reasoning, performing the sub-task of determining
attribution relations is critical. The sub-task of
accurately attributing propositions may seem
relatively straightforward when a single sentence
contains values for all three elements of the attribution relation, especially when the author of
the sentence is a subject of the attribution. For
example, we can find values for all three elements within sentence (1), taken as a sentence
within a judicial decision written by a judge acting as the factfinder in the case:
(1) The court agrees with the testimony
of the petitioner’s expert witness that the
varicella vaccine can cause neuropathy in
humans.
In this sentence we find sound linguistic evidence for using the clausal complement embedded in the sentence (i.e., the varicella vaccine
can cause neuropathy in humans) as the attribution object or attributed propositional content.
The sentence also provides evidence of two subjects to which the content is attributed (i.e., the
petitioner’s expert witness and the court). Finally, we find sufficient linguistic cues for making
this attribution (i.e., the testimony of for the petitioner’s expert, and agrees with for the court).
However, it is very often the case that in judicial decisions we do not find plausible values for
all three elements within a single sentence. Most
often, we must resort to extra-sentence linguistic
cues and presuppositional information to formulate and test hypotheses about attribution relations. Consider, for example, the following sentence (an embedded proposition within sentence
(1)):
(2) The petitioner’s expert witness testified that the varicella vaccine can cause
neuropathy in humans.

The mere occurrence of such a sentence is generally not sufficient evidence that the judge herself
believed that what the witness stated is true. The
judge’s sentence might simply be restating the
witness’s testimony. However, in a particular
context, there might be warrant for attributing the
proposition not only to the petitioner’s expert
witness, but also to the factfinder herself. For
example, sentence (2) might occur in a paragraph
where it is clear that the factfinder finds the petitioner’s expert witness more credible than the
opposing witness, the petitioner has no alternative witness or evidence on which the factfinder
might rely, and the factfinder is in fact making an
ultimate finding in favor of the petitioner. Given
this context, we could reasonably infer that the
judge as factfinder is also adopting or relying
upon this testimony by the petitioner’s expert.
Even the occurrence of the following declarative sentence (embedded in sentence (2)) might,
in the right context, be sufficient evidence that
the judge as author of the decision believes the
stated proposition to be true:
(3) The varicella vaccine can cause neuropathy in humans.
For example, the occurrence of sentence (3) in a
section of the decision entitled Findings of the
Court might warrant attributing it to the judge as
factfinder (but it does not warrant this inference
in every case).
The previous paragraphs illustrate the subtleties of inference required for making accurate
attributions within a judicial decision. But that
discussion focused on three declarative sentences
with straightforward syntactic structures. English
sentences, however, can take diverse grammatical forms while still providing attribution information. Consider the following sentences drawn
from actual judicial decisions, each of which
provides attribution information:
(4) Her June 2001 symptoms of palpitations, rapid heart beat, shortness of breath,
and diaphoresis were also consistent with
myocarditis, in his opinion.
(5) The sort of post hoc ergo propter hoc
reasoning offered by Dr. Corbier has been
consistently rejected by the Court.
(6) Although Dr. Kane initially thought
that Will’s cerebellar ataxia was due to a
viral infection, he changed his mind when
he realized that the course of Will’s ataxia

was lasting too long to be of the run of the
mill type.
(7) The undersigned notes that the Federal
Circuit in Althen affirmed the Honorable
Susan G. Braden’s decision that tetanus
toxoid caused petitioner’s optic neuritis.
Note just a few of the complexities for attribution on the basis of these sentences. Sentence (4)
illustrates how solving the attribution problem is
often dependent on solving the coreference problem (his). Sentence (5) illustrates the use of noun
phrases to refer to propositional objects presumably expressed in some other sentence or sentences of the document, and illustrates other difficulties in identifying the precise propositional
content to attribute to the Court. Sentence (6)
illustrates the efficiency with which English can
state multiple attributions in one sentence. Sentence (7) illustrates the nesting of attributions,
but also raises such questions as whether the verb
affirmed when predicated of an appellate court
really means that we can attribute to the appellate
court the finding of fact of the lower court.
With these examples, I have merely hinted at
the extent of variability in legal texts when it
comes to providing information about attribution.
Express attribution can take a huge variety of
syntactic forms, and implicit attribution is dominant in the style of English authors. This can lead
to substantial inconsistency among human annotators. Law students, even after completing one
or two years of legal education, produce results
that are significantly unreliable (inconsistent)
and inaccurate. Moreover, there is good reason to
think that experienced attorneys would also display significant variability, since they have had
no formal training in analyzing attribution relations.
The reality of low inter-annotator reliability
and of inaccuracy for attribution relations introduces the next topic: the need to produce protocols for how humans could independently, consistently and accurately annotate attribution relations within legal documents.
3.4

Developing (Human) Protocols

The production of a sufficient quantity of accurately annotated corpora requires that multiple
annotators be working on the project. In one
sense, producing the protocols needed for each
sub-task is a problem of effective education or
pedagogy. However, it turns out to be a difficult
problem to produce consistently accurate results.
And perhaps surprisingly to someone not in-

volved in legal education or who has not been
through legal education, the legal academy has
spent very little time trying to develop such pedagogical techniques, even though the skills involved seem central to legal reasoning.
Here I will give only one example of the problems encountered in developing protocols for
identifying attribution relations. As noted in Section 3.3 above, identifying the appropriate attribution subjects (actors) and attribution objects
(propositions) can pose significant problems,
such as determining coreference and formulating
precise propositions. But even if we adopt a
strategy of setting aside for the moment the subtasks involved in solving these difficult reference
problems, and focus attention on the sub-task of
identifying and annotating attribution cues, we
still encounter significant challenges for developing protocols. In general we can say that there
are three types of problem. One type of problem
is to determine which intra-sentence linguistic
expressions can function as attribution cues. For
some expressions the answer seems straightforward (e.g., agrees with), while for others the answer is more difficult (e.g., affirms). A second
type of problem is to determine which extrasentence but intra-document linguistic evidence
can function as attribution cues (e.g., document
segmentation). A third type of problem is identifying presuppositional or background information that is relevant in warranting attribution
(e.g., the role of appellate courts with respect to
trial courts).
These layers of problems suggest that decomposition into sub-tasks and developing protocols
for specific sub-tasks is the only promising strategy. Until we have some adequate theory and
consensus on exactly which types of semantic
data we should be annotating, and until we can
decompose the annotation process into sub-tasks
and have developed and tested human protocols
for performing and integrating those sub-tasks,
we will have little hope for automating the annotation process. I also believe that progress down
that road will be made by stages, using an approach parallel to that for TAR: as protocols for
human annotators are being developed and tested
for individual sub-tasks, we should be developing software that can assist (not replace) humans
in performing that particular annotation sub-task.
Gradually we can develop more powerful software analytics.

4

Conclusion

I have argued that in order to make advances in
automating argumentation mining in law, we
have a critical need for legal documents that have
been manually annotated as corpora. Moreover,
we must have theoretical and experimental reasons for regarding those annotated data as sufficiently accurate. In order to generate such corpora, we should decompose broader tasks into subtasks, and should develop protocols for effectively training people to perform those sub-tasks.
Such protocols would be useful not only for performing quality assurance on the finished annotations, but also for developing and testing software to assist in the process of annotation. In
such a way, we can hope to grow incrementally
but steadily toward automated argumentation
mining in law.
At the Hofstra University Research Laboratory for Law, Logic and Technology (LLT Lab),
which I direct, we currently have projects for
annotating argumentation in vaccine-injury compensation decisions, medical malpractice decisions, and decisions about veterans claims.
Moreover, we are collaborating with Kevin Ashley and Jaromir Savelka at the University of
Pittsburgh, and with Matthias Grabmair and Eric
Nyberg at Carnegie Mellon University, in automating sub-tasks in text annotation. At the LLT
Lab, we also develop, in addition to the semantic
data as such, the protocols for guiding humans in
the annotation of texts, and we work on writing
software rules that can assist in following such
protocols. It is painstaking work, but I believe it
is necessary work in the right direction.
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